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ROTHBARD'S INTELLECTUAL
ANCESTRY
University of Chicago

M

URRAY ROTHBARD is a prominent spokesman for neo-Austrian economics, yet the economics profession has not taken him seriously
enough to investigate his claims. He and his disciples invlte this neglect by
treating the Rothbardian corpus more as creed-to-be-adhered-to than as
the:ory-to-be:-tested-and-improved-on.
The profession's neglect is nonetheless unwise. Even if neo-Austrian economics turns out to be unsound, it
should be taken seriously because of the growing number of intelligent
people who identify themselves as Austrians.
IRothbard's methodology is crucial to the soundness of his approach. It
must be defended if he is to exempt himself from the formal and statistical
standards of the rest of the profession. In several locations, Rothbard sets
down the basic principles of his method,' but nowhere in enough detail to
satisfy the unconvinced. Instead, he refers to eminent figures from the past in
uhose works will presumably be found the missing links in his own expositlon. To take Rothbard seriously, then, amounts to taking seriously his
account of his intellectual ancestors. A critique of his account is not just of
ialue for the light shed on his standards of historical research; more importantly, since Rothbard relies on his ancestors to fill in his methodological
gaps, it may shed light on the strength of the methodology on which he
proposes to erect the neo-Austrian alternative.
Rothbard claims that praxeology, which he identifies with "the
~xiomatic-deductivemethod" in economic^,^ has a long tradition. At the
=ginning of that tradition he locates Jean-Baptiste Say, for whom praxeolag) "was the basic method." He goes on to state that Say was "perhaps the
F k t praxe~logist."~
However, contrary to these claims, Say's Treatise on
Pvlirical Ecolnomy lends itself only grudgingly to identification with
Rd~bardianpraxeology. Consider in evidence the following passage:

In political economy, as in natural philosophy, and in every other
study, systems have been formed before facts have been established;
the place of the latter being supplied by purely gratuitous assertions.
More recently, the inductive method of philosophizing, which, since
the time of Bacon, has so much contributed to the advancement of every
other science, has been applied to the conduct of our researches in this.
The excellence of this method consists in only admitting facts carefully
a*
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observed, and the consequences rigorously deduced from them;
thereby effectually excluding those prejudices and authorities which, in
every department of literature and science, have so often been interposed between man and truth.4
Surely here we have a sympathy with Baconian inductivism, which is
incompatible with praxeology.
Unfortunately, the limits of space do not permit a consideration of the
lesser figures such as Cairnes and Senior whom Rothbard places next in the
. ~ maintains that several decades later, "during
praxeological m ~ v e m e n tHe
the 1870's and 1880's, . . . the praxeological method was carried on and
further developed by the Austrian school, founded by Carl Menger of the
University of Vienna."6 Menger is a major figure in anyone's history of
thought, so it is worth considering whether he, more than Say, is a consistent
proponent of the praxeological method. In this regard the following lines
from Menger are illuminating:
Nothing is so certain as that the results of the exact orientation of
theoretical research appear insufficient and unempirical in the field of
economy as in all other realms of the world of phenomena, when
measured by the standard of realism. This is, however, self-evident,
since the results of exact research, and indeed in all realms of the world
of phenomena, are true only with certain presuppositions, with presuppositions which in reality do not always apply. . . . There is scarcely
need to remark that the above presuppositions in real economy all hold
only in rare cases and that therefore as a rule real prices deviate more or
less from economic ones (those corresponding to the economic situation). In the practice of economy people in fact endeavor only rarely to
protect their economic interests completely. Many sorts of considerations, above all, indifference to economic interests of lesser significance, good will toward others, etc., cause them in their economic
activity not to protect their economic interests at all in some cases, in
some cases incompletely. They are, furthermore, vague and in error
concerning the economic means to attain their economic goals; indeed,
they are often vague and in error concerning these goals themselves.
Also the economic situation, on the basis of which they develop their
economic activity, is often insufficiently or incompletely known to
them. Finally their economic freedom is not infrequently impaired by
various kinds of relationships. A definite economic situation brings to
light precisely economic prices of goods only in the rarest cases. Real
prices are, rather more or less different from e c o n o m i ~ . ~
Note that Menger is advocating what would today be called model
building-working out the consequences of a set of presuppositions that are
often lacking in reality. In this respect, though of course not in some others,

Menger is closer to the methodology of Milton Friedman8 than to that of
Rotlhbard. Ur~likeother economists who either claim that "man is rational"
is true but empty or who apologetically claim that it is false but empirical, the
praxeologist claims that it is both true and empirical. Thus, in this vital
respect Menger is no praxeologist.
Contemporary praxeologists without exception acknowledge a
methodological and substantive debt to Ludwig von Mises. He was both an
advocate of tlie wordpraxeology and an exemplar of what it means. Mises
was explicitly a Kantian in that he believed that important theoretical
statements in economics are synthetic a priori and can be justified along
Kant's line fior justifying such statements. That line consisted mainly of
providng a "t:ranscendental deduction" of the twelve categories of thought
(chief among them was "causation"-"action"
was not included). The two
versions of the deduction are among the most difficult reading in philosophy
and have earned the gratitude of professors by providing an inexhaustible
source of paper topics. What the deductions purport to do is to show that the
categories are necessary presuppositions of our having any propositional
knowledge at all. When the categories, so deduced, are applied to "the
manifold of space and time" (which is, roughly, sense data or the given), the
result is synthetic a priori statements, among the most notable examples of
which are the axioms of Euclidean geometry.
Lord Macaulay said of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason that "1 tried to read
i t , but found it utterly unintelligible, just as if it had been written in Sanscrit.
Not one word of it gave me an idea except a Latin quotation from Persius. It
seems to me that it ought to be possible to explain a true theory of
Apart from its obscurity,
metaphysics in words that I can ~ n h e r s t a n d . " ~
Kam's position can he criticized on three main grounds. First, Kantians have
never been able to agree on how many categories there are and on what they
are. Second, Kant's prime example of synthetic a priori truths has been
refuted. It was not just the development of non-Euclidean geometries by
Lobachevsky and Riemann that caused the problem. The fatal blow came
when Einstein found that the Reimannian geometry is compatible with
relativity theory whereas Euclidean geometry is not.'' The third criticism of
Kani's positioln is that it results in transcendental idealism. Although Kant
cia~niledthat his idealism is unobjectionable, it is difficult to see how it
differs from tlhe more mundane variety. Both claim that men can have no
knowledge of things-in-themselves, and both are hard put to avoid the
&surd reduction to solipsism.
Of the criticisms of Kant, only the third seems to have carried much
uelght with modern praxe~logists.~'
Even von Mises was concerned enough
b> the charge of idealism to produce a defense against it: "Only those groups
ciluld survive whose members acted in accordance with the right categories,
1 e , with those that were in conformity with reality and therefore-to
use the
concept of pragmatism-worked. "I2 Thus, for von Mises natural selection
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' ensures that our synthetic a priori knowledge is realistic. Ingenious as this
defense is, it is apparently not ingenious enough to convince Rothbard and
most other praxeologists to accept Kantianism as the philosophical underpinnings of praxeology .
Unfortunately, however, there is no account in Rothbard, comparable in
scope and detail to von Mises's, of what the true underpinnings are. Occasionally Rothbard declares that he is an Aristotelian, but he only gives hints
of what it is in Aristotle that he thinks relevant. In addition, he never
considers whether in the relevant respects Aristotle's position may be subject
to serious objections. Here, an attempt will be made to isolate and evaluate
the aspects of Aristotle relevant to praxeology. Before doing this, however,
it makes sense to examine three other methodologists whom Rothbard
quotes approvingly: Weber, Schutz, and Croce; for it may be that in the work
of one of them will be found insights as to how Aristotle's philosophy is to
relate to praxeology .
Rothbard says that "the Austrians were endeavoring to construct a 'verstehende' social science, the same ideal that Max Weber was later to
uphold."13 The central concept of Weber's verstehende social science is the
"ideal type." Weber provides this account of its characteristics:
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An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more
points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete,
more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual
phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct (Gedankenbild). In its conceptual purity, this mental construct (Gedankenbild)
cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia. Historical research faces the task of determining in each individual case, the
extent to which this ideal-construct approximates to or diverges from
reality, to what extent for example, the economic structure of a certain
city is to be classified as a "city-economy .' ' . . . It is possible, or rather,
it must be accepted as certain that numerous, indeed a very great many,
utopias of this sort can be worked out, of which none is like another,
and none of which can be observed in empirical reality as an actually
existing economic system, but each of which however claims that it is a
representation of the "idea" of capitalistic culture. Each of these can
claim to be a representation of the "idea" of capitalistic culture to the
extent that it has really taken certain traits, meaningful in their essential
features, from the empirical reality of our culture and brought them
together into a unified ideal-construct. For those phenomena which
interest us as cultural phenomena are interesting to us with respect to
very different kinds of evaluative ideas to which we relate them.
Inasmuch as the "points of view" from which they can become
significant for us are very diverse, the most varied criteria can be
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applied to the selection of the traits which are to enter into the construction of an ideal-typical view of a particular culture.14
As was the case with Menger,15 Weber is best seen as advocating what would
today be called model building.16 Thus, as with Menger and Friedman,
economic theory may contain important elements that are unrealistic. In an
almost instrumentalist way, theories are to be judged by their relative
applicability to the empirical facts, not on their strict truth or falsehood. For,
strictly speaking, all ideal types are empirically false. Thus, Weber's ideal
types are inconsistent with the claims that are made for the praxeological
method. This is not to say that in actual fact von Mises and Rothbard do not
in their economics use constructs that function as ideal types. In fact, the
"evenly rotating econorny" is a perfect example of such a construction. Of
this ideal type von Mises says:
These insoluble contradictions, however, do not affect the service
which this imaginary construct renders for the only problems for whose
treatment it is both appropriate and indispensable: the problem of the
relation between the prices of products and those of the factors required
for their production, and the implied problems of entrepreneurship and
of profit and loss.17
But the use of ideal types by Austrian economists does not alter the fact that
such constructs cannot consistently be part of the praxeological method. The
praxeologist who saw this most clearly was von Mises himself in an early
section of Human Action entitled "On Ideal Types. "I8
The second methodologist whom Rothbard quotes approvingly is Alfred
Schutz. In a discussion of our knowledge of human action Rothbard says:
Alfred Schutz pointed out and elaborated the complexity of the interaction between the individual and other persons, the 'interpretive understanding' or Verstehen ,upon which this universal, prescientific knowledge rests. The common-sense knowledge of the universality of motivated, intentional human action, ignored by the positivists as 'unscientific,' actually provides the indispensable groundwork on which science itself must develop. l g

1

The following shows Weber's ideal type to be at the core of Schutz's position:
It is one of the outstanding features of modern social science to have
described the device the social scientists use in building up their
conceptual scheme, and it is the great merit of (Durkheim, Pareto,
Marshall, Veblen, and) above all Max Weber, to have developed this
technique in all its fullness and clarity. This technique consists in
replacing the human beings which the social scientist observes as actors
on the social stage by puppets created by himself, in other words, in
constructing ideal types of actors.20
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It has already been shown that the Weberian ideal type is a nonpraxeological
concept. But Schutz tries to do more than just reiterate Weber's theory. He
seeks to elaborate and secure it by applying to it the phenomenological
analysis of Edmund Husserl. Husserl sought to get to the true essence of
phenomena by "bracketing out" all the common beliefs of everyday life.
After the philosopher had succeeded in systematically ignoring all of our
everyday beliefs, he then would be able to intuit the essence of phenomena in
their unpolluted purity. Consider what Husserl would have us bracket out:
The whole world as placed within the nature-setting and presented in
experience as real, taken completely "free from all theory," just as it is
in reality experienced, and made clearly manifest in and through the
linkings of our experiences, has now no validity for us, it must be set in
brackets, untested indeed but also uncontested. Similarly all theories
and sciences, positivistic or otherwise, which relate to this world,
however good they may be, succumb to the same fate.21
The question, of course, is how with all this in brackets anything intelligible
can be said about what is left. Jeff Bedrick of the Chicago Philosophy
Department tells the story of how as a boy Husserl had beengiven a knife. He
decided that he wanted to get it really sharp, so he got a whet-stone and
started grinding. Never satisfied that he had gotten the knife sharp, he kept
grinding until he had nothing left. Later in life Husserl said that he sometimes felt that he had done the same thing with his philosophy.
To the extent that Schutz is Weberian, he is nonpraxeological; to the
extent that he is Husserlian, he is at best obscure.
The final methodologist to be considered before focusing on Aristotle is
Benedetto Croce. He had, according to Rothbard, "his own highly developed praxeological position. "''Among the more illuminating of Croce's
comments on economics are those following his endorsement of the similarity of mechanics and economics:
Mechanics are nothing but the complex of formulae of calculation
constructed on reality, which is Spirit and Becoming in Metaphysic,
and may be abstracted and falsified in Science, so as to assume the
aspect of Force or a system of forces, for the convenience of calculation. Economy does the same thing, when it cuts off from the volitional
acts certain groups, which it simplifies and makes rigid with the
definition of the "economic man," the laws of "least means," and the
like. And owing precisely to this mechanicizing process of economic
Science, it is ingenuous to ask oneself why ethical, logical, or aesthetic
facts are not included in Economy, and in what way they can be
included. Economic science is the sum of abstractive operations effected upon the concept of Will or Action, which is thus quantified.23

This passage bears out the summary of Croce's position on economics that is
presented by H. S. Harris:
In spite of Croce's insistence that the "utility" of the economists is a
fu:ndamental philosophical category, his logic does not allow the admission of economics itself as a genuine philosophical science. The
work of economists, like that of all other scientists, belongs to the
caitegory of utility itself, not to that of truth. "Economic man" is a
paradigm case of a pseudo concept '*
Since the praxeologist wants to consider economic theorems not just useful
but also true, Croce is not a praxeologist.
It had been hoped that by looking at other methodologists of whom
Rothbard approves, it might be possible to gain an insight into the sense in
H hich he considers himself an Aristotelian. Unfortunately, this hope has not
k e n fulfilled. So it is necessary to look directly at Aristotle to see if he was in
m:y respect a proto-praxeologist.
'The first difficulty that arises is the well-known apparent inconsistency
wlween Aristotle's theory of science in the Organon and his actual practice
ai it in such works as the Historia Animaliurn. In the theory, Aristotle saw
Kience as demon~strative,while in practice he relied much more on induc:,an. Th~edistinction is not clear-cut, however, since even in the Organon
4rlstotle saw a role for induction, problematic though that role may be.25
6 arlous attempts have been made to reconcile theory and practice, one of the
m a t plausible of which claims that Aristotle saw the syllogistic only as the
n:shr effective method of teaching the truth, while careful observation is the
r a p e r inethod alf arriving at it.26 But this reconciliation could not be
dcepteci by a praxeologist, for he wants to claim that deduction is more than
a reaching device, being at the very least a method of justification and,
;-.<reby, of arriving at the truth. So the praxeologist must choose between
r a i l .%n~totles, opting of course for the Aristotle of the Organon. This is the
k~3rotleof the demonstration, for whom, as Ross notes, "demonstration is
%+r:nufic ~ y l l o g i s m . "In
~ ~the actual work of praxeologists not even the
&*rc theory of demand has been formalized syllogistically. But if Aristotle
a :J se brought into the praxeological camp, the praxeologists will have to
~
~that such
~
formalization
~
i
r
is possible and, for the sake of demonstrative
----&-a- ancl clarity, desirable. Whether Rothbard, at least, would be willing to
-LC
IS admission is doubtful. He comes out against formalization in
f modem !symbolic logic, opting instead for what he calls "verbal
"' This "verbal logic" might mean the syllogistic, but it probably
ince Rothbard seems to think that he and the praxeologists have
hieved all the necessary rigor.
stotle is not to be followed in his syllogistic method, then perhaps the
f his philolsophy that is to support praxeology is his justification of

22

REASON PAPERS NO. 5

first principles. Rothbard has claimed that the first principle of praxeology
-"man acts''-is
self-evidently true." He believes that there is a specific
sort of argument in Aristotle that can be used to demonstrate the selfevidence of this principle.30Aristotle had argued that the man who denies the
law of noncontradiction contradicts himself since, by making an assertion,
he presupposes the validity of the law.31 Similarly, Rothbard argues:
A . . . self-contradiction faces the man who attempts to refute the axiom
of human action. For in doing so, he is ipso facto a person making a
conscious choice of means in attempting to arrive at an adopted end: in
this case the end, or goal, of trying to refute the axiom of action. He
employs action in trying to refute the notion of action.3z

This argument is persuasive, but it is important to be clear on exactly how
much or how little it proves. The axiom "man acts" is vague in many
respects. Does it assert that all men act, or only some? Does it assert that each
acting man acts all of the time, or does it allow for nonacting behavior? Most
importantly of all, what meaning of the word action does it presuppose? The
meaning and implications of this concept are notoriously difficult to pin
down, as evidenced by the number of recent books that have attempted,
without reaching consensus, to do so.33
What is sought from the wide range of possible interpretations of the
action axiom is the strongest one provable by the Aristotelian argument.
Now a person who denies the action axiom is himself intentionally doing
something at aparticular time. So he does not contradict himself if he either
denies that all men sometimes act or that any manalways acts. In short, what
the Aristotelian argument proves is the following: the statement "some men
sometimes do things intentionally" cannot be consistently denied. This
statement is in turn a formal tautology, since it depends for its truth upon a
"denial" being defined as an intentional action. Whether from this base
anything of interest can be inferred (all of economics, say) is another
question.
The results of this paper may be summarized briefly. First, Rothbard's
account of his intellectual ancestry is inaccurate or subject to much qualification. Second, there are good grounds for doubting that a sound philosophical defense of Rothbard's praxeology can be given. On the latter point, much
more can be said, but here only a final caveat is in order. A refutation of
Rothbard's methodology should in no way detract from the insights and
substantive work of other economists who identify themselves as Austrians.
Israel Kirzner's analysis of entrepreneurship, Gerald O'Driscoll's treatment
of credit cards, F. A. Hayeks's business cycle theory, Laurence Moss's
research on the history of economic thought, and Mario Rizzo's work on
crime34all deserve fuFther attention.

*I am thankful for the time given by Alan Stockman, Martin Cook, David Mitch, and Mario
Rizzo in criticizing an earlier draft. This paper bears little resemblance to that draft except that
both are concerned with the status of praxeology. Since writing this paper, a valuable, though
not always clearly written, critique of Rothbard's praxeology has come to my attention: Claudio
Gutierrez, "The Extraordinary Claim of Praxeology," Theory and Decision, 1971, pp.
327-36. Gutienez shows that, motivated by empirical considerations, Rothbard routinely
d e f i n e s terms in the course of his "deduction" of theorems from the fundamental action
axiom. Walter Block has written a reply to this article: "A Comment on 'The Extraordinary
Claim of Praxeology' by Professor Gutierrez," Theory and Decision, 1973, pp. 377-87. But
Block's reply fails to face squarely, let alone refute, Gutierrez's main thesis.
1. See Murray N. Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing,
1970). pp. 63-66; "Praxeology: Reply to Mr.Schuller," American Economic Review, Dec.
1951, pp. 943-16; "In Defense of 'Extreme Apriorism,' " Southern Economic Journal, Jan.
!95'1, pp. 3 14-2.0; "Praxeology as the Method of Economics," Phenomenology and the Social
Sciences, vol. 2 , ed. Maurice Natanson (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1973),

2 . Rothbard, "Praxeology: The Methodology of Austrian Economics," in The Foundaof Modern Austrian Economics, ed. Edwin G. Dolan (Kansas Ctiy: Sheed Andrews &
'.6chieel, 1976), p. 21.
3 . Ibid., pp. 19, 25.
4 . Jean-Baptiste Say, A Treatise on Political Economy (Philadelphia: Grigg & Elliot,

nun3

5. Rothbard, "Praxeology: The Methodology of Austrian Economics," pp. 2 6 2 7 .
%&bard is joined in his praise for Cairnes by Milton Friedman, who in class used to laud him
g the first economist to make predictions and then go back and check how they turned
cifically, in 1859 Cairnes predicted the consequences of the Australian gold discovery.
ns in 1873 he appended apostscript evaluating their accuracy. J .
Espisode" and "Postscript," in Essays in Political Economy
llan, 1873), pp. 2G52.
"Praxeology as the Method of Economics," p. 330.
ger, Problems of Economics and Sociology (Urbana: University of Illinois
'The Methodology of Positive Economics," in Essays in Posiomics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 3-43.
Quoted in Brand Blanshard, On Philosophical Style (Bloomington: Indiana University

F M a brief and simple review of the issues, see Stephen F. Barker, s. v. "Geometry ," in
Rothbard, "Praxeology: The Method of Austrian Economics," p. 24, and
gy as th~eMethod of Economics," p. 315. It should be noted that another issue, the
metry, played a significant role in the early, much-neglected, dispute between
r Hano Bernadelli and positivist Felix Kaufmann. Bernadelli, "What Has
to Contribute to the Social Sciences, and to Economics in Particular?" Economica,
6, pp. 443-45; Kaufmann, "Do Synthetic fropositions a Priori Exist in
a Reply to Dr. Bernadelli," Economica, Aug. 1937, pp. 3 3 7 4 2 . For a further
to the exchange that does not discuss the geometry issue, see also Lionel Robbins,
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"Live and Dead Issues in the Methodology of Economics," Economica, Aug. 1938, pp.
342-52.
12. Ludwig van Mises, The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science (Princeton, N.J.: D.
Van Nostrand, 1962), p. 15. In this work, pp. 12-14, von Mises also briefly attempted to deal
with the problem of non-Euclidean geometries.
13. Rothbard, "Praxeology as the Method of Economics," p. 332.
14. Max Weber, " 'Objectivity' in Social Sciences," in The Methodology of the Social
Sciences (New York: Free Press, 1949), pp. 90, 91.
15. For a passage in Menger that closely anticipates Weber's ideal-type theory, see Menger,
Economics and Sociology, p. 36. For an account of Menger's impact on Weber, see Thomas
Burger, Max Weber's Theory of Concept Formation (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press,
1976), pp. 15@53 and passim.
16. Burger, ibid., treats ideal-types in this way himself and documents how common this
interpretation has been among other writers (pp. 212-13). For Rothbard's condemnation of
model building, see Rothbard, "The Mantle of Science," inScientism and Values, ed. Helmut
Schoeck and James W. Wiggins (Princeton N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1960), p. 166.
17. Ludwig von Mises, Human Action (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1966), p. 248. In part of a
long discussion of the evenly rotating economy (ERE) Rothbard says: "In sum, rather than
being in some sense more persistent and more real than the actual market, the 'long run' of the
ERE is not real at all, but a very useful theoretical construct that enables the economist to point
out the direction in which the market is moving at any given time-specifically, toward the
elimination of profits and losses if existing market data remain the same. Thus, the ERE concept
is especially helpful in the analysis of profits and losses as compared to interest. But the market
data are the only actual reality." Man, Economy and State (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing,
1970), pp. 3 0 6 7 .
18. Von Mises, Hurnan Action, pp. 59-64.
19. Rothbard, "Praxeology as the Method of Economics," p. 3 16.
20. Alfred Schutz, "The Social World and the Theory of Social Action," in Collected
Papers, vol. 2 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), p. 17.
21. Edmund Husserl, Ideas, as partially reprinted in Philosophy in the Twentieth Century,
vol. 3, ed. William Barrett and Henry Aiken (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 101.
22. Rothbard, "Praxeology as the Method of Economics," p. 333.
23. Benedetto Croce, Philosophy of ehe Practical (London: Macmillan, 1913), pp. 374-75.
24. H. S. Harris, S.V."Croce, Benedetto," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
25. For a brief mention of some of the problems, see W. D. Ross, Aristotle (London:
Methuen, 1937), pp. 3 8 4 1 .
26. See Jonathan Barnes, "Aristotle's Theory of Demonstration," in Articles on Aristotle,
vol. 1. ed. Barnes et al. (London: Duckworth, 1975), p. 85.
27. Ross, Arisrotie, p. 43.
28. By the way, Rothbard's rejection of logistics is unjustified, since he rests it on the claim,
"If the logistic array of symbols were used, each proposition would not be meaningful." Man,
Ecor~omyartdStare, p. 65. Consider, for example, the symbolic formalizationof the syllogism:
(1) All men are mortal.

(2) Praxeologists are men.
(3) Praxeologists are mortal
One way to formalize this would be to use three predicates: M = manhood, F = finite-lifehood
(mortality), P = praxeologisthood. Then the syllogism would be formalized as:

Contra Rothbard, each proposition in the above formalization is meaningful. Symbolic formalization of a verbal deduction is merely translation from one language into another. Its value rests
in exhibiting more clearly the structure of complicated arguments so that their rigor can be more
easily evaluated. For a detailed examination of the relation between modern and Aristotelian
logic, see Jan Lukasiewicz, Aristotle's Syllogisticfrom the Standpoint ofModern Formal Logic
(London: Oxford University Press, 1957).
29. Rothbard, "Praxeology: The Methodology of Austrian Economics," p. 28: see also,
idem, "In Defe.nse of 'Extreme Apriorism,' "Southern EconomicJournal, Jan. 1957, p. 317.
30. Rothbard, "Praxeology: The Methodology of Austrian Economics," p. 28.
I: 1. Aristotl~:,Metaphysics 4. 3. 1006a-1009a, in The Basic Works ofAristotle, ed. Richard
McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), pp. 737-43. For a detailed examination of this
argument, see R. M. Dancy, Sense and Contradiction: A Study in Aristotle (Dordrecht,
Holland: D. Rcidel, 1975). See also Douglas B. Rasmussen, "Aristotle and the Defense of the
Law of Contradiction," Personalist, Spring 1973, pp. 1 4 1 4 2 .
:12. Rothbard, "Praxeology: The Methodology of Austrian Economics," p. 28.
713. See, e.g., Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose (New York: Humanities Press, 1973);
Allin Goldmam, A Theoiy of Human Action (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970);
Robert Binkley et al., eds., Agent, Action, andReason (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1971); and Myles Brand, ed., The Nature of Human Action (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman,
19-10).
154. Israel Kirzner, Competition and Entrepreneurship (Chicago: University of Chicago
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